At a glance
- The problem
- Donors and agencies want to know that assistance reaches the intended people. Humanitarian cash programmes involve many partners, banks and shops, and a lot of reconciliation work.
- How a shared ledger helps
- A shared ledger can record entitlements and transactions between agencies and retailers, reducing reconciliation and making each step traceable for the organisations involved.
- Main limits
- Data about vulnerable people needs strong protection. A ledger cannot confirm that help was actually received or used as intended, and transparency for donors must not expose recipients.
Why traceability matters in aid
Humanitarian and development aid passes through long chains: governments and private donors fund international agencies, which work with national organisations, local partners, banks, mobile money providers and shops. Each link keeps its own accounts. Reconciling them takes time and money, and gaps in the record create room for errors, duplication and fraud.
Cash assistance — giving people money or vouchers rather than goods — has grown because it lets recipients choose what they need and supports local markets. It also creates a large volume of small transactions that agencies must track and account for.
Two different goals
Back-office coordination
The first goal is efficiency among agencies. When several organisations assist the same population, they need to know who is receiving what, to avoid both gaps and duplication. A shared ledger among those organisations can record entitlements and payments in one place, so each agency sees the same picture without passing spreadsheets back and forth.
Public transparency
The second goal is transparency towards donors and the public: showing where funds went and what they achieved. This is mainly a question of publishing reliable, comparable data. The International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) provides an open data standard for exactly this purpose, and many governments, agencies and charitable organisations publish to it without using any ledger.
Protecting recipients comes first
People receiving aid are often in vulnerable situations: refugees, survivors of conflict or disaster, people at risk of persecution. Information about who they are, where they live and what assistance they receive could put them in danger if it leaked or were shared with the wrong authorities.
For this reason, humanitarian data protection guidance — such as the handbook published by the International Committee of the Red Cross with the Brussels Privacy Hub — stresses data minimisation, purpose limitation and careful risk assessment, especially for biometric data. In any ledger design, personal data should stay off the ledger, and access should be limited to organisations with a clear need.
What ledgers cannot see
A ledger records digital events. It cannot confirm that food was eaten, that a shelter was built properly or that a payment was not taken from a recipient by someone else. Monitoring, feedback from recipients and independent evaluation remain the main ways to know whether aid achieved its purpose. Transparency claims that rely on "every transaction is on the blockchain" can therefore create false confidence.
A note on cost and capacity
Any system used in emergencies must work with unreliable connectivity, limited local technical capacity and partners who change frequently. Simple, well-understood tools often perform better in these conditions than sophisticated ones, and the cost of building and maintaining a ledger must be weighed against the savings it brings.
Questions to ask about a ledger in aid delivery
- Who is the ledger for? Coordination among agencies, reporting to donors and accountability to recipients are different goals that need different designs.
- What is recorded about recipients, and where? At most, references that cannot be linked to a person outside the agencies' protected systems.
- Who can join and who can read? Host authorities, donors and partners may each ask for access; every request should be weighed against the risks to the people receiving help.
- Can people decline without losing assistance? Help should not depend on accepting biometric registration or a particular technology.
- What happens when the programme ends? Data should be deleted or archived securely, so the system does not leave behind records that could later be misused.
- How will results be evaluated? An independent evaluation should compare costs, errors and recipients' experience with the arrangements that existed before.
Humanitarian staff also change jobs and locations often, so any system needs clear documentation and simple procedures that a new team can take over quickly. A design that only its original developers understand is a risk in itself.
Where it has been tried
The UN World Food Programme's Building Blocks project is the most thoroughly documented example. Starting in 2017, WFP used a permissioned ledger to record food assistance transactions for refugees in camps in Jordan, where people paid in supermarkets using iris-scan authentication. WFP has described reduced bank fees and simpler reconciliation as the main benefits. The system was later extended to coordinate assistance between several humanitarian organisations in other countries.
Building Blocks recorded transactions among participating organisations; it was not designed to publish data about recipients. The use of biometrics in humanitarian settings, including in this programme, has been discussed critically by data protection specialists.
Other charities and agencies have run smaller pilots, often focused on donor-facing transparency. Few have published independent evaluations.
When a database is enough
For public transparency, publishing to the IATI open data standard, supported by independent audits, meets most needs. For coordination among agencies, a shared database run by a lead agency or an inter-agency body, with clear data-sharing agreements, often works well and is easier to maintain.
A ledger may help where many organisations of similar standing need a common transaction record and none wants to depend on another to keep it. Even then, protecting recipients and checking real outcomes on the ground matter more than the technology.
Sources
- World Food Programme, Innovation Accelerator — Building Blocks
- International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) Standard
- International Committee of the Red Cross and Brussels Privacy Hub, Handbook on Data Protection in Humanitarian Action (2nd edition, 2020)
- NIST, Blockchain Technology Overview (NISTIR 8202), 2018
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